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Theresa May’s speech today outlined five major conditions that she felt any Brexit deal had to fulfil.  
She argued first and foremost that any deal must “respect the referendum result”.  Nevertheless, it 
is not clear precisely what any given deal must do in order to pass this.  In part this is due to the way 
in which the referendum question was framed: whilst a modest majority of voters voted against 
remaining in the EU, it is much less clear what, precisely, they were voting for.  Whilst migration was 
of paramount importance for many leave voters, others would perhaps be content to remain within 
the European Economic Area and Customs Union for the purported economic benefits.  For still 
others, fishing will have been the key issue and for many a, perhaps somewhat amorphous, desire 
for greater (British) sovereignty or repatriation of powers. 
In some cases, a degree of confusion between the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of 
Justice of the EU may have played a part.  The case of Abu Qatada, for example, has been raised by a 
number of people we have spoken to.  In any event, for each of these groups, the key contours of 
Brexit will have meant something different and it is unclear how to translate these very individual 
conceptions into how to “respect the referendum result” in aggregate. 
The second major test – that any agreement reached should stand the test of time – is perhaps 
better founded.  Nevertheless, it is clear that the UK’s involvement with the EU is likely to evolve 
over time as are the wishes of her people (demographic change alone is will see to that).  As to the 
remainder of the conditions there is a strong argument to be made that they are somewhat vacuous.  
“Protecting jobs” is a fantastic political soundbite, but the overwhelming majority of available 
evidence suggests that labour market conditions (and particularly unemployment) are largely the 
result of domestic policy.  The economic arguments over Brexit are rather over the impact on living 
standards and quality of jobs. 
Likewise, it’s hard to see how a political agreement can lead to a Britain that is “modern, open, 
outward-looking and tolerant”.  In fact, it is not at all clear what such phraseology even means (what 
is a “modern” Britain?  What brand of “tolerance” is a trade deal supposed to encourage?  Are we to 
be tolerant of those views which we find uncomfortable or abhorrent?) 
Finally, Theresa May’s assertion that an agreement must “strengthen the precious union of our 
people” is deeply problematic.  It is far from clear what the government (or, indeed, the devolved 
administrations) has done to address the problem of a vote in which Scotland voted overwhelmingly 
to remain part of the EU (as did London) but most of England voted equally passionately to leave.  
Indeed, we do not even yet fully understand why the constituent parts of the UK voted differently, 
let alone how to address those differences.  The situation in Northern Ireland is even more serious 
with the vote appearing to divide primarily along religious lines (as with so much else). 
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Nevertheless, a number of parts of the speech were clearly designed to appease critics of the 
Government’s policy, both at home and abroad.  Her statement on the Irish border, namely that 
“[w]e chose to leave and we have a responsibility to help find a solution” is likely to find favour 
amongst those within the EU (including the Irish government) who have hitherto shown frustration 
with the administration. 
The speech also pointed to an ongoing “blurring” of some of the UK Government’s red-lines, 
particularly regarding the role of the Court of Justice of the EU.  It is thus far unclear whether the 
Prime Minister will be able to convince her European colleagues to support her vision of third-party 
arbitration.  It is unclear what Theresa May would be able to offer in order to induce them to do so, 
although an “EFTA” style court seems the most likely option if agreed. 
The notion of “reciprocal binding commitments” to ensure fair competition may yet prove 
problematic for those wishing to “take back control”.  Ultimately, this comes against the same 
dilemma that the UK (and others) have always faced – there is a trade-off between sovereignty and 
frictionless trade.  The same is, of course, true of the Prime Minister’s ambition to retain 
“substantially similar” regulatory standards on goods.  In fact, this commitment to fair competition is 
one area where the UK Government appears closer to its European counterparts than the opposition 
Labour Party. 
The details of her recent speech did lay out a number of areas where policy has evolved.  In 
particular, the Government appears much keener on retaining membership (albeit some form of 
“associate” membership) of a variety of EU agencies.  To a large extent this appears sensible and 
pragmatic – it is difficult to see how dropping out of the European Aviation Safety Agency or 
European Medicines Agency would be in the UK’s national interests.  Maintaining most elements of 
Open Skies is an obvious imperative. 
The Government’s acknowledgement of the importance of cross-border supply chains is very 
welcome.  Equally, it is unclear how the Customs Partnership envisaged by the Prime Minister would 
ultimately be enforced.  What is to stop third parties fraudulently using the UK in order to access the 
European market with reduced tariffs?  Or, indeed, vice versa.  It was interesting that the 
Government appears to have abandoned any hope of obtaining passporting rights for the financial 
services sector, instead relying on some form of equivalence and mutual recognition that has yet to 
be specified. 
In sum, the UK’s position has evolved substantially over the course of negotiations and the latest 
speech by the Prime Minister embodies this.  Ultimately, considerable pragmatism will be needed 
and as the junior partner the UK will need to accept the vast majority of the EU’s requirements.  
Nevertheless, the UK does appear to be moving towards a situation in which the trade-off between 
the complete sovereignty desired by many proponents of Brexit and frictionless trade is at least 
made explicit.  What is less clear is how the continued sticking point of Northern Ireland can be 
addressed outside of a full Customs Union and thus ongoing primacy of EU standards, including the 
role of the ECJ as arbiter of these. 
